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Abstract:  
Using the NBS dataset over the period 1998-2007, this paper examines the dual roles of 
financial assistance and strong political links on firm survival in China by applying a semi-
parametric duration model. We find that generally either financial assistance or strong politica l 
links had a positive effect on the likelihood of firm survival. Furthermore, if firms received 
both types of support from government, their survival rate was around 2 times as high 
compared to only receiving a single support. The likelihood of survival depended on the 
amount of assistance a firm received. We also find firm ownership impacts on its surviva l 
pattern. Lastly, China joining the WTO coincided with (cet. par.) higher firm failure, especially 
with regard to state-owned firms; however, this period also saw the authorities targeting 
political and financial help on the ‘better’ firms (especially SOE’s) with characteristics likely 
to increase their chance of survival.  
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1. Introduction 
China is perceived as a country that provides large-scale assistance to industry (Haley and 
Haley, 2013). By financial assistance, we also include tax holidays as well as subsidies (see 
Aghion et. al., 2015; Harris and Li, 2016). But what is the effect of government assistance on 
the likelihood of firm failure? A recent paper by He and Yang (2016) investigated the 
determinants of firm failure in China and stressed the role of government support. Using 
subsidies, loans from banks and whether located in a key industry, as proxies for government 
support, the results showed that supportive policies can help firms survive and also mitiga te 
the impact of competition effects on older firms. Howell et. al. (2016) also investigated the 
mediating effects of government assistance on new firm failure, finding that subsidies 
positively helped firms to survive, although agglomerated firms with more subsidies tend to 
exit.  
However, none of the studies to date have considered the associated role of political affilia t ion 
(i.e., links with central, provincial or local government), which in China can be considered as 
another form of government assistance. (Faccio, 2006; Li et.al.,2006; Tan et. al., 2007). Liet. 
al. (2005) linked political behaviour to firm survival for state-owned firms; they classified such 
SOEs into those related to central government vis-a-vis local government and found that central 
SOEs had a higher probability of staying in the market. But their study is limited to one Chinese 
Science Park in Beijing during the period 1995-2002. Furthermore, Du and Girma (2010) 
considered new private sector firms in manufacturing, using data from the Annual Report of 
Industrial Enterprises Statistics of China between 1999 and 2005. They classified the firm’s 
political links into three categories: high government affiliation, middle government affilia t ion 
and local government affiliation. They presented evidence to show that new private firms seek 
political affiliation with government to lower their exit risk by reducing future uncertainty.  
Based on the above literature, political affiliation and direct government assistance have both 
been shown to help firms survive, but is too much assistance from both political connections 
and financial help a good thing? In this paper, we investigate the impact of both on firm surviva l, 
for all types of firms – not just SOEs, or new firms or those limited to the private sector. We 
do this by introducing government financial assistance, political affiliation, and interact ions 
between the two, as well as other covariates (e.g., state ownership and private ownership), into 
a Cox proportional hazard model. As a robustness check, we also apply parametric models 
using a Weibull distribution, a Complementary log-log model as well as an Accelerated Failure 
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Time model. The coefficients from these various models confirm the robustness of our 
preferred approach using the Cox approach that firms receiving assistance, no matter the level 
of assistance, will generally face a much lower hazard rate of failure than non-assisted firms. 
Moreover, firms with political links to central or provincial governments who also received 
financial assistance had a survival probability that was (cet. par.) up to twice as strong as the 
effect of only having strong political links. Overall our results also show that there was a major 
change after China joined the WTO in 2001, with the authorities targeting joint financial and 
political help more specifically on firms more likely to survive, especially the ‘better’ SOEs, 
but private-sector firms with strong political links had a significantly higher risk of failure.  
Apart from the literature mentioned above, we are only aware of three other papers which have 
considered either assistance or political ties as the determinants of Chinese firm failure. Zheng, 
et. al.  (2015) used data for TV manufacturing between 1993 and 2003, confirming that politica l 
ties can lower exit risk. Focusing on a limited sample of Hong Kong firms covering March to 
September 2008, a working paper by Sharif and Huang (2012) found that government financ ia l 
support for firms’ innovation activities from government had no impact on survival. Other 
literature studying the case of government assistance or political links in other developing and 
developed countries is rare and the results are inconsistent. Hansen et.al.(2009) investiga ted 
both the direct and moderating effects of direct government assistance on small-and-med ium 
sized manufacturing enterprises in Vietnam, and found that direct government support had no 
impact on firm failure, while firms with governments as their main customer showed a higher 
survival rate.  
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows. In the next section, we review previous 
research and put forward the hypotheses/rationale for government assistance affecting business 
failure in China. In section 3, the data, measurement issues, methodology and results are 
presented. The final section concludes. 
 
2. Rationale of government support  
China began the transition from a planned economy to a market economy in the early 1990s 
(Brandt and Rawski, 2008). At the same time, the opening-up of markets was aided by a process 
of decentralization, whereby local and provincial governments have been granted greater 
autonomy in industrial policy. Thus, market competition emerged at local and regional level, 
and these competition effects have been amplified by China entering the WTO at the end of 
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2001. Domestic firms lacked the organizational and technical capabilities to compete with 
fully-developed overseas competitors, with such capabilities needing to be learned from 
learning-by-doing (Khan, 2015). Chinese policymakers concluded from the successful 
experience of Korea and Japan, there was a need to support ‘strategic industries’ (Harris and 
Li, 2016). Therefore, Chinese policymakers made available large subsidies and tax incentives 
to finance learning-by-doing in firms, to help them survive as competition significantly 
increased. At first only SOEs could receive assistance with their managers lobbying for 
subsidies and tax holidays from government officials; thus SOEs enjoyed preferential status 
for obtaining bank loans (Che, 2002), for entering into new markets and often becoming 
monopolies in such markets. However, since the late 1990’s, after privately-owned firms were 
legitimized and formal private ownership were endorsed as ‘an important part of the socialist 
market economy’ by central government (Sun et.al., 2010), financial assistance has also been 
given to the private sector . 
In addition to financial assistance, the government also controls and provides assistance to 
certain enterprises through a lishu relationship, which means a firm is "subordinate to" or 
"directly controlled by" government.1 This involves “… approvals for licences, domain, major 
projects, major operations decisions (such as profit distribution and investment) and firm 
structures” (Tan et. al., 2007, p. 788), all of which are set to meet political objectives. As well 
as controls, the lishu relationship also involves government support and subsidies (e.g., access 
to finance, more favourable tax treatment, as well as the granting of contracts, access to raw 
materials and other ‘scarce resources’2, etc.). For privately owned firms, political links are 
typically established once government own some of the shares of the firm, or through accepting 
government input (Du, 2016). The latter includes but is not limited to capital, land, loans, and 
approvals for licenses. The level of government to which a firm is subordinate usually depends 
on its ownership structure, location, scale as well as industry and strategic importance (Li, 
2004). Generally, SOEs or firms located in an industry of strategic importance tend to affilia te 
with higher levels of governments, while private firms are more likely to affiliate with lower 
levels of governments.  
                                                 
1 The Chinese name for this relationship, as represented in the National Bureau of Statistics database we use 
below, is 隶属关系. 
2 Closer ties to government can also help businesses to overcome market and state failures in securing property 
rights and enforcing contracts – Li et. al., (2008) and Zhou (2013). Note, therefore, this definition of politically 
connected firms is different to the approach adopted by Faccio (2006), who looked at such connections across 
47 countries (excluding China). 
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Different levels of government often have different policy objectives; for example, central 
government controls more monopolized resources and thus grants firms under their control 
more privileges (Tan et al., 2007) with Haley and Haley (2013) concluding that provincia l 
governments generally deploy massive subsidies to their favoured enterprises for provincia l 
objectives rather than those set by central authorities. SOEs affiliated with higher level of 
government generally are expected to meet certain ‘social’ goals set by politicians, such as 
employment targets, but it can still be relevant to privately-owned and foreign-owned firms 
(either because of the strength of political connections and/or because of intervention by 
government).3  In this paper (see next section), we categorized all firms into three groups by 
their lishu relationship; firms affiliated with central or provincial governments are categorised 
as having strong political links, those affiliated with local governments4 as having medium 
political links5, and lastly firms with no political links. 
Although political links with government means an additional layer of support, often the firm's 
own interests may be constrained. For example, in privately-owned firms affiliated with higher 
level of government, central/provincial governments usually retain the right to appoint CEOs 
as well as make the ultimate decisions regarding any potential merger or acquisition (Fan et. 
al., 2007). And as stated in Sun et. al. (2010), if local government directly financed the firm at 
start-up they often became deeply involved in the operational decision-making process. Such 
relationships between business and government may harm competitiveness due to the 
probability of rent seeking (Porter, 1990); for example, compared with non-politica l ly 
connected firms, evidence has been presented that shows if firms’ CEOs are politica l ly 
connected, they will be more likely to employ current or former government bureaucrats rather 
than professional directors (Fan et.al., 2007),  which can have a negative impact on firm 
operation decisions and increase the risk of firm failure.  However, whether financial assistance 
or political assistance – and their combination – impacts on firm failure is an empirical issue, 
to which we now turn, noting Ding et. al. (2016) who show that in the manufacturing sector 
only 16% of firms had no political affiliation with governments in 1998, while in 2007 this 
figure had grown to 76%.  
                                                 
3 An essential difference in the lishu relationship between publicly-controlled and privately-owned firms tends 
to be that the former are more beset with meeting policy goals (e.g., employment) rather than receiving 
favourable treatment such as subsidies and/or access to finance (Wu et. al., 2012, Guariglia and Mateut, 2016).   
4 Including prefecture-, district-, city-, county-, township- as well as village-level governments 
5 Note that in our empirical work (section 3 below) firms with medium political links are the benchmark sub-
group. 
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3. Data and empirical methodology 
3.1 Data  
Our data are obtained from the annual accounting reports filed by industrial firms with the 
National Bureau of Statistics (NBS) over the period of 1998-2007. The dataset includes 
medium and large-sized firms with sales above five million yuan (about US$743,200) as well 
as extensive information on the firm’s establishment year, employment, political affiliation (i.e., 
'lishu'), and whether a firm received a tax holiday and/or subsidies (Harris and Li, 2016, provide 
more details on the extent of financial subsidies). The database covers more than 550 thousand 
firms, corresponding to 2.18 million firm-year observations.  
In order to investigate the factors influencing firm survival, it is necessary to define the duration 
of the life of a firm. Based on information on when the firm opened, we include all firms that 
opened since 1978 (which is the beginning of the transition from a planned to a market 
economy in China), unlike other papers using the same dataset which mainly focused on firms 
opening since 1998 or 1999. Using the NBS dataset, there are three situations where a firm can 
exit from the dataset: (1) a decision to stop operations due to financial problems or government 
policy; (2) a merger or acquisition by other firms;6  (3) sales drop permanently below the 
threshold of 5 million yuan (Audretsch et. al., 2016). Whilst we can mitigate against (2) – see 
footnote 2 – we do not know if (3) leads ultimately to firm closure. Thus, we follow He and 
Yang (2016), and measure ‘firm failure’ instead of ‘firm death’, where a firm’s failure in year 
t is based on it being observed in the dataset up to t but not in subsequent periods; thus firms 
falling below 5 million yuan are counted as having failed. We identify 1.8 million firms7 who 
entered the market on and after the year of 1978 and are present for at least some or all of 1998-
2007.  
The definition of the variables used here are presented in Table 18 . Figure 1 presents the 
percentage of firm that failed for certain different subgroups. Specifically, firms that received 
assistance had on average a lower failure rate around 9.8% compared to the average of 12.0% 
for those that received no assistance. The average failure rate for firms with strong politica l 
                                                 
6 We generally observe ‘exit’ when the firm’s unique company code disappears from the dataset. But, for some 
firms, merger or acquisition results in the creation of a new company code, not the adoption of the code of the 
acquiring firm. Using company name, address and zip code, we have re-established the pre-existing code to 
mergers and acquisitions where a new code had been wrongly created. 
7 We think it is important not to, a priori, drop what may seem to be outliers without direct evidence . 
8 TFP was taken from Harris and Li (2016),which uses the same methodology as that used in Ding et. al. (2016). 
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links was 8.5%, which was lower than firms receiving assistance. Overall, firms receiving both 
financial assistance and with strong political links enjoyed the lowest failure risk. 
 
3.2 Empirical specification 
Previous studies of China have applied different models to investigate the determinants of firm 
survival (e.g. Pan and Chi, 1999; Li, Zhang and Zhou, 2005; Lu and Xu, 2006; Batjargal, 2007; 
Lin and Huang, 2008; Naidoo, 2010; Murray et.al., 2012). He and Yang (2016) applied a linear 
probability model to test if government subsidies affect firm survival. Sharif and Huang (2012) 
applied a probit model to investigate the role of public financial support on HK-owned firms 
in Guangdong province, and Zheng et.al. (2015) applied a two-stage probit model to discover 
 
Figure 1: Percentage of firmsa that failed in China, 1999-2007 
 
a Covers manufacturing, mining and utilities     Source: NBS data 
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Table 1: Definitions and descriptive statistics for variables used in determining firm surviva l, 
China 1998-2007 
 
  firms that never 
failed 
firms that failed  All firms 
Variable Description 𝑋 σ 𝑋 σ 𝑋 σ 
Not Assisted 
Dummy variable = 1 if firm 
receives no financial 
assistance 0.379 0.485 0.429 0.495 0.385 0.486 
Assistance 
rate<10.4% 
Dummy variable = 1 for 
<10.4% rate of assistancea  0.169 0.375 0.136 0.343 0.165 0.372 
Assistance rate 
10.4%-<15.2% 
Dummy variable = 1 for 
10.4% to < 15.2% assistance  0.159 0.366 0.153 0.360 0.158 0.365 
Assistance rate 
15.2%-<18.7%%+ 
Dummy variable = 1 for 
15.2% to 18.7% assistance  0.142 0.349 0.151 0.358 0.143 0.350 
Assistance rate 
more than 18.7% 
Dummy variable = 1 for more 
than 18.7% 0.152 0.359 0.131 0.338 0.149 0.357 
High political links 
High political affiliation with 
central or provincial 
governments 0.037 0.188 0.041 0.198 0.037 0.189 
Medium political 
links 
High political affiliation with 
local governments 0.358 0.479 0.450 0.498 0.368 0.482 
No political links No political Affiliation 0.605 0.489 0.509 0.500 0.595 0.491 
Firm size 
Ln the firm's total 
employees >300 4.749 1.061 4.347 1.078 4.705 1.070 
Age 
Firm age since its 
establishment 9.264 5.797 9.411 5.816 9.280 5.799 
ln age ln firm age 2.024 0.658 2.040 0.663 2.026 0.659 
Foreign owned  
Dummy variable = 1 if 
proportion of capital that is 
foreign-owned >=0.5b 0.077 0.267 0.043 0.202 0.074 0.261 
State owned  
Dummy variable = 1 if 
proportion of capital owned 
by state >=0.5 b 0.071 0.257 0.093 0.290 0.074 0.261 
HK/Macau/Taiwan 
owned  
Dummy variable = 1 if 
proportion of capital that is 
HK/Macau/Taiwan 
owned >=0.5 b 0.085 0.278 0.059 0.236 0.082 0.274 
Collective owned  
Dummy variable = 1 if 
proportion of capital owned 
by collectives >=0.5 b 0.115 0.320 0.165 0.371 0.121 0.326 
Private owned  
Dummy variable = 1 if 
proportion of capital owned 
privately >=0.5 b 0.651 0.477 0.640 0.480 0.650 0.477 
Non-exporter 
Dummy variable = 1 for firm 
that does not export 0.719 0.449 0.805 0.396 0.729 0.445 
R&D 
Dummy variable = 1 for firm 
undertaking R&D activities 0.106 0.308 0.044 0.206 0.099 0.299 
ln TFP 
ln total factor productivity 
estimated by GMM (Harris 
and Li, 2016) -2.332 1.565 -2.373 1.596 -2.337 1.568 
ln agglomeration 
ln % of industry output (2-
digit SIC) located in each 
province in which firm is 
located-MAR spillovers 1.871 1.114 1.772 1.199 1.860 1.124 
ln herfindahl 
ln herfindahl index of 
industrial concentration(by 2-
digit SIC) -6.459 1.070 -6.431 1.063 -6.456 1.069 
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ln diversification 
ln proportion of 3-digit 
industries 
-0.622 0.344 -0.656 0.376 -0.625 0.347 
ln fixed costs 
ln % of selling and 
distribution costs of firm's 
sales 1.061 0.878 1.043 0.924 1.059 0.883 
City200 
Dummy variable = 1 if firm 
located in top 200 cities based 
on population size 0.818 0.386 0.800 0.400 0.816 0.387 
Tariff rate(Fob final 
goods) 
Percentage rate of ad valorem 
tariff (fob tariff goods) for 44 
industries 11.374 6.277 11.559 6.415 11.394 6.293 
East Coast 
Dummy variable for firm 
located in East Coast areac  0.703 0.457 0.661 0.473 0.699 0.459 
Central 
Dummy variable for firm 
located in Central Chinad   0.140 0.347 0.170 0.376 0.144 0.351 
North east 
Dummy variable for firm 
located in North Ease  0.060 0.237 0.063 0.243 0.060 0.237 
Western 
Dummy variable for firm 
located in Western Chinaf  0.097 0.296 0.105 0.307 0.098 0.297 
%open 
% of new firms opening in 
each year by 
province/industry 2.183 2.658 1.917 2.506 2.155 2.643 
Period 2003-2007  0.695 0.460 0.686 0.464 0.694 0.461 
N Number of observations 1,179,462 143,445 1,322,907g 
a I.e., 100  (financial subsidies + value of tax holidays)  value added. All values are deflated by the industry producer price 
index. The choice of cut-off points for assistance rates were chosen based on estimating equation (2) using a wide range of 
alternatives and then using the model with the lowest log-likelihood value (‘best’ fit).9 
b For firms with <50% share ownership in a particularly category, they were assigned to the largest ownership sub-group 
c Guangdong, Fujian,Zhejiang,Jiangsu,Shandong,Hainan,Hebei,Beijing,Tianjin,Shanghai 
d Hunan,Jiangxi,Hubei,Anhui,Henan,Shanxi 
e Liaoning,Heilongjiang,Jilin 
f Xinjiang,Tibet,Gansu,Qinghai,Sichuan,Chongqing,Yunnan,Guizhou,Guangxi,Inner Mongolia 
g The unpublished appendix contains details of how through data cleaning and limitations we have this number of 
observations available for estimating equation (2) below. 
 
the effects of political ties for Chinese TV manufacturing firms. A Probit model takes no 
account of the difference in length of time each firm was at risk of failure.10 In contrast others 
have used duration models, including an Accelerated Failure Time model (Howell et. al., 2016), 
a Complementary log-log model (Zhang and Mohnen, 2013), and the Cox Proportional Hazard 
model (Li et al., 2005; Du and Girma, 2010; Audretsch et. al., 2016). Despite the strengths and 
weakness of each approach, our preference is for the Cox proportional hazard model (Cox, 
1972), which has the advantage of placing no strict assumptions on the nature of the hazard 
probability distribution. Moreover, several papers have emphasized the role of firm age in firm 
survival (Li et.al.,2005; Lu and Xu, 2006; Batjargal, 2007; Chang and Xu, 2008); here we 
                                                 
9 This approach also allowed to establish – see below – the cut-off points for the impact of assistance on the hazard 
rate of failure, establishing that an inverted U-shape relationship existed. 
10 We have estimated a duration model in preference to, say, a logit or probit model since the latter cannot take 
account of (right) censoring which occurs in 2007; and the logit model also does no t distinguish how long a firm 
has been exposed to failure, and we would expect the risk of failure differs for new firms versus firms that have 
been operating for many years. However, as a check we have also compared our results to those obtained using 
a standard logit model, and the results (in terms of marginal effects) are very similar (see Table A.1 column 5).  
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incorporate this by allowing for different baseline hazards using stratification (based on 
different age subgroups) within the sample (Puranamet. al., 2006). We use four intervals: lower 
than 5 years, 5-10 years, 10-20 years and more than 20 years to capture the different risk rate 
of different age groups. 
The hazard of failure for firm i conditioned on surviving up to the time t can be generally 
expressed as: 
ℎ(𝑡, 𝑥) = ℎ0(𝑡)exp⁡(x(t)β)          (1) 
where ℎ(𝑡, 𝑥)is the probability of failure in year 𝑡, having survived until year 𝑡, ℎ0(𝑡) is a non-
parametric baseline hazard function 11  that is shared by all firms and 𝑒𝑥𝑝(𝑥(𝑡)𝛽)  is a 
parametric function of time-varying firm characteristics. In our study, ℎ(𝑡, 𝑥)⁡is the probability 
that a firm exits from the NBS dataset before t years, where t ranges between 0 to 29 years. 12   
The main purpose of this paper is to assess the extent to which government support from strong 
political connections and/or financial assistance affects firm survival. To test this hypothesis, 
we also add interaction terms between financial assistance and strong political links to the 
vector x in equation (1). We also know that after China joined the WTO, there was a significant 
increase in new (private sector) firm entry, which brings with it a higher rate of failure, as well 
as increased competition.  
Therefore, we also introduce a time dummy to capture a likely higher rate of firm failure post 
China entering the WTO.13   
ℎ(𝑡, 𝑥) = ℎ0(𝑡)⁡exp⁡[β1Assisted𝑖𝑡(⁡× ⁡2003− 07⁡dummy)+𝛽2Strong⁡political⁡links𝑖𝑡 ⁡(× ⁡2003− 07⁡dummy)+
⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡𝛽3Assisted𝑖𝑡 ⁡× ⁡Strong⁡political⁡links𝑖𝑡(⁡× ⁡2003− 07⁡dummy)+ 𝛽𝐷D]   (2) 
Note two versions of equation (2) were estimated, one with and one without the shift dummy 
for 2003-07; hence the use of the parenthesis in the equation. Lastly, D presents all other 
variables in the model with all the variables that equation (2) defined in Table 1. 
3.3 Control variables 
The list of control variables to be included in the analysis follow theory and previous empirica l 
studies. Firm-specific characteristics include the age, size (Che et.al., 2011; Audrestsch et. al., 
                                                 
11 As stated we adjust baseline hazards using stratification. 
12 Note, we do not use a fixed-effects hazard model where we would allow each firm to have its own intercept, 
since Allison (2002) has shown this leads to significant parameter bias due to the ‘incidental parameter 
estimates’ problem.  
13 Note, our time dummy takes on the value 1 for 2003-07, rather than 2002-07, to allow for a lag in the cet. par. 
immediate impact of WTO on the hazard rate of failure. 
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2016), ownership (Li, et.al., 2005; Du and Girma, 2010), export behaviour, whether 
undertaking R&D or not, as well as such factors as diversification, agglomeration, fixed costs, 
and industry concentration levels.  
The age of the firm is used, in stratifying the baseline hazard, to control for the likelihood that 
older firms face a lower hazard rate of failure because of learning-by-doing effects (e.g. 
Jovanovic and Nyarko, 1996).14 The firm’s employment size proxies for cost advantages for 
larger firms due to operating at or above the minimum efficient scale (e.g. Agarwal and 
Audretsch, 2001) or because it has been shown that larger start-ups are more likely to grow 
than smaller ones (Fritsch et.al., 2006).  
In addition, there is evidence that spatial co-location of firms has an impact on surviva l. 
Agglomeration externalities are usually distinguished in the literature according to whether 
they are an intra- or inter-industry phenomenon. Intra-industry externalities are termed MAR 
(Marshall, 1890; Arrow, 1971; Romer, 1986) or localization externalities, while inter-indus try 
externalities are termed Jacobian (Jacobs, 1970, 1985) or urbanization externalities. The 
mechanisms that give rise to agglomeration externalities can support both localization and 
urbanization externalities; i.e., firms may learn from other firms in the same industry and from 
firms in another industry, in a particular location. We also include a dummy that takes on a 
value of 1 for those firms located in one of the top 200 cities (based on population size in year 
t), as an additional proxy for potential negative spillovers (i.e. ‘congestion’ costs) in large 
Chinese cities that is related to overall density of local economic activity. Ciccone and Hall 
(1996) claimed that the denser the local economy, the more accessible were high quality local 
services and demand, therefore reducing the likelihood of firm failure.   
Export behaviour is expected to have a positive effect on firm survival as exporting firms tend 
to have higher productivity and profitability to help them survive (Helpman, 2006; Salomon 
and Shaver,2005; Inui, et. al., 2017). Many studies had pointed out that firms undertaking R&D 
activities will affect firm survival (e.g., Franco et. al., 2009; Kim and Lee, 2016); the innovation 
effort of a firm is related to higher efficiency (Esteve-Pérez and Mañez-Castillejo, 2008) and/or 
higher competitiveness (Cefis and Marsili, 2006), thus providing such firms with the 
capabilities leading to a greater probability of survival. The market power of firms is usually 
included to take account of overall competition effects; Staber (1998) suggested that balanced 
competition can foster firm survival in a volatile market environment, while stronger 
                                                 
14 Note, age is not directly included as this would be fully collinear with the dependent variable measuring 
survival duration. 
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competition can induce firms into implementing R&D activities, adopting new technologies 
and operating more efficiently (Nickell, 1996; Meyer and Vickers, 1997). Lastly, we follow 
others and include such variables which may impact on firm failure as fixed costs (e.g. 
Lederman, et.al. 2016), total factor productivity (e.g. Che, et. al. 2011; Zheng, et. al., 2015); as 
well as the geographic region in which the firm is located (Jovanovic, 1982; Acs and Plummer, 
2005; Cainelli, et. al. 2014). 
 
Figure 2: Survival rate among different subgroups estimated by Kaplan-Meier estimator 
 
 
 
4. Results 
4.1 Descriptive statistics 
Table 1 presents the summary statistics of the variables used in the survival analysis. Means 
and standard deviations of the main variables used in estimation are reported for firms that 
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never failed (column 1), firms that failed (column 2) and all firms (column 3)15. Overall, 37% 
of firms failed over the period considered, with (in terms of our univariate analysis) firms 
receiving assistance having a higher survival rate. The table shows that overall failing firms 
are more likely to be non-assisted, smaller, older, less efficient and non-exporters. Regarding 
the industrial-specific characteristics, surviving firms seem to benefit from agglomeration and 
market competition.  
Using a non-parametric Kaplan-Meier survival estimator Figure 2 plots the survival rates for 
various sub-groups; firms with strong political links which also received assistance lower than 
10.4% had the highest survival rate while firms with strong political links had the lowest 
survival rates.  
Table 2: The overall effects of key variables on firm failure estimated by Cox proportional 
Hazard Model 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 
Assisted model:  
no time dummy 
Assisted model: 
with time 
dummy 
Assistance rate model: 
no time dummy 
Assistance rate model: 
with time dummy 
Receiving assistance -0.072*** -0.068*** — — 
Assistance rate<10.4% — — -0.165*** -0.162*** 
Assistance rate10.4%–<15.2% — — -0.056*** -0.050*** 
Assistance rate 15.2%–<18.7% — — 0.049*** 0.057*** 
Assistance rate 18.7%+ — — -0.114*** -0.113*** 
Strong political links -0.033* -0.044** -0.026 -0.036* 
State-owned firms -0.151*** 0.045*** -0.153*** 0.043*** 
Private-owned firms -0.143*** -0.162*** -0.142*** -0.161*** 
Period 2003-2007 — 0.423*** — 0.424*** 
Observations 1,322,907 1,322,907 1,322,907 1,322,907 
Note: Stratified on age, *** /** / * denote statistical significance at the 1%/5%/10% levels. Based on results in Table 3. 
 
4.2 The main results 
Table 2 reports the key results for the overall effects of receiving assistance, having strong 
political links, whether State-owned/Private-owned as well as differences pre- and post-WTO 
membership, on the likelihood of firm failure.16 Columns (1) and (2) report the results when 
assistance is entered as a 0/1 dummy depicting whether any financial assistance was received 
or not; cet. par., firms receiving assistance were around 7% less likely to fail. Having strong 
                                                 
15 A t-test for the equality of the means of failing firms and non-failing firms all reject the null hypothesis at the 
1% significance level.  
 
16 The full set of results are set out in Table 3. The results in Table 2 show the overall marginal effects (i.e., the 
probability of a change in the hazard rate) when all interactions effects have been ‘solved out’ (e.g., 
𝜕ℎ(𝑡,𝑋)
𝜕𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑛𝑔⁡𝑝𝑜𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑐𝑎𝑙 ⁡𝑙𝑖𝑛𝑘𝑠𝑡
). Since it is not possible to change the value of the interaction variables (in Table 3) without 
changing one of their constituent variables, the marginal effects on the interactions are, in isolation, of limited use.  
Specifically, if all three terms 𝑥1 ,𝑥2,𝑥1⁡× ⁡⁡ 𝑥2⁡ enter the model, then changing the interaction term 𝑥1 ⁡× ⁡ ⁡𝑥2 
cannot impact on ℎ(𝑡, 𝑋)  independently of changing 𝑥1 ,𝑥2⁡. Nevertheless, the interaction terms allow us to 
comment on the underlying factors leading to the overall impact of a variable, and we shall make use of these 
when interpreting what has been happening, particularly when comparing 1998-2002 with 2003-07. 
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political links reduced the hazard rate by some 3-4% (depending on whether the time dummy 
enters equation 2 or not), while being a privately-owned firm resulted in a lower probability of 
failure by some 14-16%. When the time dummy is included, the results show that post-2002 
firms experienced over a 42% higher likelihood of failure and being State-owned increased 
failure by some 4%. When the time dummy is omitted, being an SOE reduced the likelihood 
of failure by over 15%, indicating that there was a significant change in SOE failure rates after 
China joined the WTO, which would be missed in a (mis-specified) model that omitted the 
time dummy. This result is discussed below more fully.  
Columns (3) and (4) represent the results when different assistance rates are entered into the 
model; the results show the impact is an inverted U-shape; the hazard rate increased with higher 
rates of assistance up to a 18.7% assistance rate, although for firms receiving above 18.7% 
assistance their hazard rate fell.17  
Table 3 reports the disaggregate effects of assistance, strong political links and ownership 
structure, as well as the impact on the hazard rate of the other covariates. We concentrate on 
the results in column (4) which is the preferred model. Compared to Table 2, which shows the 
overall (net) impact of firms receiving different rates of assistance, the results in Table 3 show 
that (cet. par.) the impact of receiving assistance on lowering the hazard rate of failure fell 
substantially after 2002; the marginal effects for the interactions with the time dummy are all 
positive and large (including for firms receiving 18.7%+ assistance).  
Strong political links lowered the hazard rate of failure; however, firms with links to central or 
provincial governments who also received financial assistance had a survival probability that 
was (cet. par.) up to twice as strong as the effect of only having strong political links – the 
exception here being firms with an assistance rate between 10.4% and 15.2%, where there was 
no additional benefit from assistance.18 Coupled with the results above – that overall the impact 
of receiving assistance on lowering the hazard rate of failure fell substantially after 2002 – 
suggests that post-WTO entry, the Chinese authorities were targeting joint financial and
                                                 
17 An agency model, of why modest levels of financial are beneficial in terms of a firm’s level of TFP, is set out 
in the appendix in Harris and Li (2016). Such assistance can lower the user cost of capital stock, th erefore 
'vintage' capital stock can be replaced by more efficient, newer capital equipment and/or allowing firms to spend 
more on R&D/improving product quality; however, when government assistance becomes too high, 'rent 
seeking' will dominate managerial effort. Our results provide support for this approach, but in the case of firm 
survival, when assistance passes a certain level, and even if ‘rent seeking’ dominates, presumably the firm can 
survive (cet. par.) because of the large subsidies being received (note, our results below in Table 3 suggest that 
receiving large subsidies may be less able to protect privately-owned firms).  
18 Note, Table U.1 in the unpublished appendix shows that strong political links  assistance  period 2003-07 
dummy was not significant, and so we omit this from Table 3. 
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Table 3:  Parameter estimates of estimated by Cox proportional Hazard Model (equation 2) 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
VARIABLES Assisted model: 
no time dummy 
Assisted model: 
with time 
dummy 
Assistance rate 
model: no time 
dummy 
Assistance rate 
model: with 
time dummy 
Receiving assistance -0.068*** -0.205*** — — 
Receiving assistance × Period 2003-2007 — 0.204*** — — 
Assistance rate<10.4% — — -0.159*** -0.252*** 
Assistance rate10.4%–<15.2% — — -0.056*** -0.192*** 
Assistance rate 15.2%–<18.7% — — 0.054*** -0.116*** 
Assistance rate 18.7%+ — — -0.110*** -0.267*** 
Assistance rate<10.4% × Period 2003-2007 — — — 0.141*** 
Assistance rate 10.4%–<15.2% × Period 2003-2007 — — — 0.206*** 
Assistance rate 15.2%–<18.7% × Period 2003-2007 — — — 0.256*** 
Assistance rate 18.7%+ × Period 2003-2007 — — — 0.228*** 
Strong political links -0.137*** -0.208*** -0.131*** -0.205*** 
Strong political links × Period 2003-2007 
 0.145* 
— 0.147* 
Strong political links × Receiving Assistance -0.107*** -0.131*** — — 
Strong political links × Assistance rate<10.4% — — -0.165*** -0.216*** 
Strong political links × Assistance rate 10.4%-<15.2% — — -0.008 -0.029 
Strong political links × Assistance rate 15.2%-<18.7% — — -0.128*** -0.129*** 
Strong political links × Assistance rate 18.7% — — -0.089** -0.102** 
Period 2003-2007 — 0.273*** — 0.271*** 
State owned -0.160*** -0.479*** -0.162*** -0.481*** 
State owned × Period 2003-2007 — 0.750*** — 0.752*** 
· 0.250*** 0.317*** 0.248*** 0.313*** 
Strong political links × State owned × Period 2003-2007 — -0.353*** — -0.347*** 
Private owned -0.152*** -0.134*** -0.151*** -0.134*** 
Private owned × Period 2003-2007 — -0.053*** — -0.050*** 
Strong political links × Private owned 0.232*** 0.239*** 0.227*** 0.237*** 
Strong political links × Private owned × Period 2003-2007 — -0.037 — -0.041 
Foreign owned -0.398*** -0.419*** -0.406*** -0.427*** 
HK/Macau/Taiwan owned  -0.229*** -0.250*** -0.240*** -0.260*** 
Firm size -0.345*** -0.346*** -0.342*** -0.343*** 
ln age -3.774*** -3.821*** -3.771*** -3.820*** 
No political links -0.298*** -0.316*** -0.296*** -0.315*** 
Non-exporter 0.159*** 0.171*** 0.164*** 0.177*** 
R&D -0.619*** -0.630*** -0.614*** -0.624*** 
ln agglomeration -0.006* -0.000 -0.006* 0.000 
ln Herfindahl -0.084*** 0.034*** -0.083*** 0.035*** 
ln Diversification -0.188*** -0.166*** -0.190*** -0.168*** 
ln Fixed costs 0.005* 0.008*** 0.007** 0.010*** 
City200 0.066*** 0.051*** 0.067*** 0.052*** 
%open -0.075*** -0.082*** -0.075*** -0.083*** 
Tariff rate -0.019*** 0.017*** -0.018*** 0.018*** 
East Coast -0.121*** -0.148*** -0.112*** -0.139*** 
North East -0.165*** -0.184*** -0.166*** -0.187*** 
Western -0.246*** -0.257*** -0.245*** -0.256*** 
ln TFP -0.167*** -0.199*** -0.165*** -0.198*** 
Industry dummies yes yes yes yes 
Log likelihood -1594389.4 -1592402.9 -1594131.2 -1592104.9 
Observations 1,322,907 1,322,907 1,322,907 1,322,907 
Note: Stratified on age, *** /** / * denote statistical significance at  the 1%/5%/10% levels.  
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political help more specifically on firms more likely to survive. The results regarding state-
owned firms – shown in column 4 in Table 2 to be associated with overall a higher failure rate 
– can also be understood better using the disaggregated results in Table 3 (column 4). State-
owned firms generally had a lower hazard rate of failure in 1998-2002, while those with strong 
political links had (cet. par.) a 31.3% higher hazard rate except post-2002 where the negative 
joint-effect of being State-owned with political links is effectively cancelled out. This again 
suggests that post-WTO entry the authorities helped politically and financially the ‘better’ 
SOEs.   
For private firms, the hazard rate of failure was lower, but firms in this sector with strong 
political links had (cet. par.) a 24% higher risk of failure. Private sector firms that resort to 
political connection with governments may introduce interventions which will distort their 
goals, e.g. government may extract benefits from connected private firms, which may be at the 
expense of other shareholders. And governments may pursue social goals instead of firm 
performance; Boubakri et.al. (2008) claimed that firms with political connection will be 
reluctant to cut their employment to reduce operation costs because of government objectives. 
Moreover, the alliance between business and politics can generate rent seeking and thus harm 
market competition (Du and Girma, 2010).  
Turning to other covariates, foreign-owned firms (vis-à-vis other ownership sub-groups) 
enjoyed the lowest hazard rate of failing; this is unsurprising given previous evidence that 
foreign owned firms often have higher TFP (Ding et. al., 2016), they are less dependent on the 
local economy (Bernard and Jensen, 2007) and governments usually provide significant 
benefits to encourage foreign-owned companies to settle in China. Generally older (Lin and 
Huang, 2008; Chang and Xu, 2008; Batjargal, 2007; Du and Girma, 2010), larger-sized (Cheet. 
al., 2011) and more efficient firms enjoy a higher survival rate. Firms involved in exporting are 
less likely to fail due to their higher efficiency associated with learning-by-exporting effects. 
Firms engaging with R&D activities are much more likely to survive (cet. par. 62% more 
likely). This is in consistent with the previous research that innovation is helpful  
for new firms to settle into a market and undermine incumbent firms (Schumpeter, 1984; 
Baumol, 2002; Cefis and Marsili, 2005). For industrial-specific variables, firms located in more 
diversified are less likely to fail, while firms located in the top 200 cities have slightly higher 
failure rates presumably due to higher levels of competition. By contrast, the hazard rate tends 
to be lower if firms were located in the western part of China; this is likely because of the 
supportive plans of the Chinese central government which has targeted this part of China for 
16 
 
increased development.19 Regarding market power (as proxied by the Herfindahl index), firms 
that operated in less competitive markets on average survived longer.   
 
Tables 4:  Parameter estimates of estimated by Cox proportional Hazard Model on "matched" 
data (equation 2)20 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 
Table 2 
results 
Matched on 
assistance (1:1) 
Matched on strong 
political links (1:1) 
Matched on both 
assistance and strong 
political links (1:5) 
Assistance rate<10.4% -0.162*** -0.146*** -0.269*** -0.251*** 
Assistance rate10.4%–<15.2% -0.050*** -0.036*** -0.111*** -0.023 
Assistance rate 15.2%–<18.7% 0.057*** 
0.077*** 
0.021 
0.058** 
Assistance rate 18.7%+ -0.113*** -0.072*** -0.156*** -0.084*** 
Strong political links -0.036* -0.032 -0.025 -0.108*** 
State-owned firms 0.043*** 0.111*** -0.048 0.016 
Private-owned firms -0.161*** -0.168*** -0.129*** -0.142*** 
Period 2003-2007 0.424*** 0.438*** 0.413*** 0.414*** 
Observations 1,322,907 954,465 91,816 128,266 
Note: Stratified on age, *** /** / * denote statistical significance at the 1%/5%/10% levels. Based on results in Table U.4. 
 
 
4.3 Robustness checks 
We have used alternative duration models to ensure that our results are not driven specifica l ly 
by different model specifications – such as the discrete time hazard complementary log- log 
model and the Accelerated Failure Time model. The results are presented in columns (1-3) in 
Table A.1 in the Appendix. Additionally, in order to address any potential selection bias due 
to financial assistance not being randomly assigned to firms (e.g., it may be the result of other 
factors such as management efforts that are correlated with the error term in the Cox model), 
we apply a propensity score matching method. Using a logit model21 to predict the probability 
                                                 
19 This started in 1999 through a series of policies, such as the Western Development Program, aimed at improving 
funding and support for R&D, help high-tech industries settlement in the west, and also stimulating Foreign Direct  
Investment (for details see Lai, 2002). In 2000, the State published ‘A Catalogue of Advantaged Industries for 
Foreign Investment in the Central and Western Regions’; the Catalogue has been revised four times since (see 
also Luo and Park, 2001). 
20  We have chosen different ratios of treated to control (i.e., 1:1 separately for firms who receives financial 
assistance and firms who built strong political links, 1:5 for firms who receives both financial assistance and built 
strong political links. Different for the last as it involved so few firms in the treatment group, only 26,362 
observations. 
21  The equation we used was as follows: for firms receiving financial assistance/those with strong political 
links/and for those with strong political links and receiving assistance, we estimate three separate 0/1 models  
comprising:  
Assistance⁡or⁡Strong⁡politcial⁡links⁡or⁡both⁡𝑖𝑡 = α0 + α1 𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑛𝑔 ⁡𝑝𝑜𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑐𝑎𝑙⁡𝑙𝑖𝑛𝑘𝑠𝑖𝑡 +
α2𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑛𝑔 ⁡𝑝𝑜𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑐𝑎𝑙 ⁡𝑙𝑖𝑛𝑘𝑠 𝑖𝑡 × 𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑡𝑒 − 𝑜𝑤𝑛𝑒𝑑𝑖𝑡 + α3ℎ𝑖𝑔ℎ _𝑝𝑜𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑐𝑠 𝑖𝑡 × 𝑝𝑟𝑖𝑣𝑎𝑡𝑒 − 𝑜𝑤𝑛𝑒𝑑𝑖𝑡 +⁡ 𝛼𝑥𝑋𝑖𝑡 + 𝜇𝑖𝑡 
Note, for firms building strong political links or firms receive both types of assistance, we omit the terms involving 
strong political links on the right-hand-side of the equation. Note 𝑋𝑖𝑡  contained the control variables listed in Table 
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of receiving assistance based on firm characteristics and estimating the logit model year by 
year,  we use one-to-one 'matching' to create a control group of firms who did not receive 
financial assistance but who otherwise had similar characteristics to those that did (the STATA 
procedure PSMATCH2 used). We repeated this ‘matching’ approach to create different control 
groups for firms who build strong political links and for those receiving both financial and 
political assistance. To test for the appropriateness of these matching procedures, we use 
balancing tests (the STATA procedure PSTEST used) as well as graphical tests. These 
balancing tests are reported in the unpublished appendix Tables U.2-U3 and Figures U.1-U3. 
The results from using "matched" data are shown in Table 4,22 indicating that our earlier results 
are generally robust even considering the potential selection bias, although of course different 
specifications do produce different specific parameter estimates. 
 
 
5. Conclusions 
Using micro-economic data from the NBS dataset over the period of 1998-2007, we apply the 
Cox proportional Hazard Model to examine the impacts of financial assistance and strong 
political links on firm survival (including the interaction of these two effects). We also take 
into account the effects of China joining WTO at the end of 2001.  
The major results we obtain show that firms receiving assistance can survive longer; with firms 
receiving less than 10.4% assistance enjoying the lowest hazard rate of failure. Also, firms 
with strong political links survive longer especially if they also receive (modest levels of) 
financial assistance. Over time, firm survival falls significantly especially after China joins the 
WTO, especially for State-owned firms. Thus, our findings provide new insights into the role 
of government support (both financial and political) in a transition economy, and especially in 
one that moved from being strongly state controlled to allowing significant competition and 
private ownership.  
In terms of policy implications, our findings indicate that in China's transition period (up to 
2002), both financial and political assistance exerted a positive effect on firm survival, while 
after joining WTO the effect turns negative. Thus, when deciding who should be assisted in 
                                                 
1. Also, since firms can get assistance on an intermittent basis (some years and not others), in order to avoid the 
matching approach selecting firms for the control group that received assistance in an earlier year but not in a later 
year (with the latter being the year it is chosen to enter the control group), we apply the logit model year by year.  
22 Table U.4 has the full results (comparable to Table 3) for the ‘matched’ models. 
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regions with less openness, government should grant support to finance learning-by-doing in 
firms to help them gain an ability to survive as competition intensifies, while for regions with 
more openness, government should reduce direct interventions. Moreover, when deciding how 
much should be granted, government should grant modest levels of assistance both financia l ly 
and politically (especially to privately-owned firms).  
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Appendix Table A.1 The coefficients of alternative modelsa 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
VARIABLES Weibull 
Complementary 
log-log model 
AFT COX logit 
Receiving assistance -0.057*** -0.073*** 0.071*** -0.068*** -0.076*** 
Strong political links -0.087** -0.094** 0.181*** -0.137*** -0.100** 
Strong political links × Receiving 
Assistance 
-0.188*** -0.116*** 0.122*** -0.107*** -0.134*** 
State owned -0.113*** -0.189*** -0.016 -0.160*** -0.184*** 
Strong political links × State 
owned 
0.140*** 0.254*** -0.175*** 0.250*** 0.281*** 
Private owned -0.137*** -0.215*** 0.118*** -0.152*** -0.234*** 
Strong political links × Private 
owned 
0.237*** 0.215*** -0.300*** 0.232*** 0.245*** 
Foreign owned -0.329*** -0.525*** 0.317*** -0.398*** -0.555*** 
HK/Macau/Taiwan owned -0.191*** -0.326*** 0.145*** -0.229*** -0.347*** 
Firm size -0.347*** -0.407*** 0.226*** -0.345*** -0.438*** 
ln age -3.911*** -0.751*** 0.686*** -3.774*** 0.012*** 
No political links -0.258*** -0.324*** 0.361*** -0.298*** -0.342*** 
Non-exporter 0.162*** 0.191*** -0.094*** 0.159*** 0.199*** 
R&D -0.647*** -0.670*** 0.563*** -0.619*** -0.698*** 
ln agglomeration 0.016*** -0.011*** 0.036*** -0.006* -0.015*** 
ln Herfindahl -0.067*** -0.061*** 0.142*** -0.084*** -0.055*** 
ln Diversification -0.139*** -0.218*** 0.296*** -0.188*** -0.244*** 
ln Fixed costs 0.012*** -0.005 -0.006** 0.005* -0.003 
City200 0.094*** 0.069*** -0.142*** 0.066*** 0.078*** 
%open -0.015*** -0.007*** 0.054*** -0.075*** -0.056*** 
Tariff rate -0.087*** -0.056*** 0.137*** -0.019*** -0.007*** 
East Coast -0.097*** -0.129*** 0.104*** -0.121*** -0.136*** 
North East -0.180*** -0.144*** 0.177*** -0.165*** -0.164*** 
Western -0.163*** -0.252*** 0.333*** -0.246*** -0.271*** 
ln TFP -0.156*** -0.231*** 0.135*** -0.167*** -0.250*** 
Industry Dummies yes yes yes yes yes 
logd  0.639***    
Constant 0.744*** -0.452*** 1.469***  -0.618*** 
Log likelihood -166971.58 -432078.35 -285417.29 -1594389.4 -443428.28 
Observations 1,322,907 1,322,907 1,322,907 1322907 1322907 
a Note: For 1% , 5% and 10% significance levels are presented by *** , **, *. 
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Table U.1 Disaggregate effects of financial assistance and strong political links on firm survivala 
  (1) (2) 
VARIABLES 
assisted with 
time 
assistance rate with 
time 
      
Receiving assistance -0.206*** — 
Assistance rate<10.40% — -0.255*** 
Assistance rate10.40%–<15.15% — -0.196*** 
Assistance rate 15.15%–<18.67% — -0.115*** 
Assistance rate 18.67%+ — -0.266*** 
Receiving assistance × Period 2003-2007 0.206*** — 
Strong political links × Period 2003-2007 0.165** 0.163** 
Strong political links × Receiving Assistance -0.102** — 
Strong political links × Receiving Assistance× Period 2003-2007 -0.044 — 
Strong political links -0.219*** -0.214*** 
Period 2003-2007 0.272*** 0.271*** 
Assistance rate<10.40% × Period 2003-2007 — 0.146*** 
Assistance rate 10.40%–<15.15% × Period 2003-2007 — 0.211*** 
Assistance rate 15.15%–<18.67% × Period 2003-2007 — 0.255*** 
Assistance rate 18.67%+× Period 2003-2007 — 0.226*** 
Strong political links × Assistance rate<10.40% — -0.132 
Strong political links × Assistance rate 10.40%-<15.15% — 0.082 
Strong political links × Assistance rate 15.15%-<18.67% — -0.179** 
Strong political links × Assistance rate 18.67% — -0.147* 
Strong political links × Assistance rate<10.40%× Period 2003-2007 — -0.119 
Strong political links × Assistance rate 10.40%-<15.15%× Period 2003-2007 — -0.159 
Strong political links × Assistance rate 15.15%-<18.67%× Period 2003-2007 — 0.068 
Strong political links × Assistance rate 18.67%× Period 2003-2007 — 0.058 
State owned -0.479*** -0.482*** 
Strong political links × State owned 0.320*** 0.316*** 
State owned × Period 2003-2007 0.751*** 0.752*** 
Strong political links × State owned × Period 2003-2007 -0.358*** -0.351*** 
Private owned -0.134*** -0.134*** 
Strong political links × Private owned 0.241*** 0.236*** 
Private owned × Period 2003-2007 -0.053*** -0.051*** 
Strong political links × Private owned × Period 2003-2007 -0.039 -0.040 
Foreign owned -0.419*** -0.427*** 
HK/Macau/Taiwan owned  -0.250*** -0.260*** 
Firm size -0.346*** -0.343*** 
ln age -3.821*** -3.821*** 
No political links -0.316*** -0.315*** 
Non-exporter 0.171*** 0.177*** 
R&D -0.630*** -0.624*** 
ln agglomeration -0.000 0.000 
ln Herfindahl 0.034*** 0.035*** 
ln Diversification -0.166*** -0.168*** 
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ln Fixed costs 0.008*** 0.010*** 
City200 0.051*** 0.052*** 
Tariff rate 0.017*** 0.018*** 
%open -0.082*** -0.083*** 
East Coast -0.148*** -0.139*** 
North East -0.184*** -0.187*** 
Western -0.257*** -0.256*** 
ln TFP -0.199*** -0.198*** 
Industry dummies yes yes 
Log likelihood -1592402.6 -1592102.2 
Observations 1,322,907 1,322,907 
a Note *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure U.1: Kernel density functions for "treated" and "control" group before and after match 
for firms receiving financial assistance(Year=1999) 
 
 
Figure U.2: Kernel density functions for "treated" and "control" group before and after match 
for firms with strong political links 
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Figure U.3: Kernel density functions for "treated" and "control" group before and after match 
for firms with financial assistance and strong political links 
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Table U.2 Balancing test results for firms receiving financial assistance 
 
  1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 
Variables  Treated Control %Bias Treated Control %Bias Treated Control %Bias Treated Control %Bias Treated Control %Bias 
Strong political 
links 
Unmatched 0.043 0.069 -11.300 0.063 0.048 1.700 0.050 0.071 -9.000 0.045 0.063 -8.000 0.040 0.059 -8.800 
Matched 0.044 0.043 0.600 0.063 0.059  0.050 0.049 0.400 0.045 0.043 1.100 0.040 0.038 0.800 
State owned  
Unmatched 0.119 0.213 -25.300 0.141 0.164 -0.200 0.114 0.203 -24.600 0.087 0.162 -23.100 0.074 0.131 -19.000 
Matched 0.121 0.123 -0.400 0.141 0.142  0.114 0.114 0.000 0.082 0.079 0.700 0.068 0.067 0.400 
Strong political 
links SOE 
Unmatched 0.021 0.037 -9.400 0.029 0.027 0.100 0.020 0.035 -9.000 0.019 0.032 -8.700 0.016 0.029 -8.600 
Matched 0.022 0.021 0.200 0.029 0.029  0.020 0.021 -0.200 0.018 0.018 0.100 0.015 0.014 0.500 
Private owned  
Unmatched 0.320 0.347 -5.700 0.388 0.367 -0.200 0.435 0.462 -5.400 0.511 0.556 -9.000 0.563 0.635 -14.800 
Matched 0.326 0.325 0.300 0.388 0.388  0.440 0.440 0.100 0.549 0.545 0.900 0.626 0.612 2.900 
Strong political 
links private-
owned 
Unmatched 0.013 0.020 -6.100 0.023 0.014 2.600 0.017 0.022 -3.700 0.016 0.020 -3.300 0.015 0.021 -4.400 
Matched 0.013 0.011 1.100 0.023 0.019  0.018 0.017 0.100 0.016 0.015 1.400 0.017 0.016 0.500 
Foreign owned  
Unmatched 0.087 0.050 14.800 0.077 0.062 0.500 0.084 0.041 17.900 0.088 0.042 19.100 0.095 0.040 21.700 
Matched 0.085 0.084 0.500 0.077 0.076  0.081 0.086 -2.000 0.070 0.072 -0.800 0.063 0.068 -2.100 
HK/Macau/Taiwan 
owned  
Unmatched 0.118 0.050 24.800 0.065 0.065 -0.300 0.115 0.051 23.100 0.118 0.054 23.200 0.110 0.049 22.800 
Matched 0.106 0.108 -0.700 0.065 0.066  0.110 0.109 0.200 0.092 0.097 -1.700 0.078 0.080 -0.900 
Firm size 
Unmatched 4.942 4.914 2.500 5.067 4.831 1.600 4.865 4.762 9.300 4.821 4.732 8.100 4.820 4.716 9.600 
Matched 4.936 4.946 -0.900 5.067 5.049  4.857 4.854 0.300 4.791 4.810 -1.700 4.779 4.777 0.100 
ln age 
Unmatched 1.949 2.034 -12.800 2.100 2.108 0.600 2.022 2.094 -11.000 2.002 2.073 -10.200 2.022 2.082 -8.800 
Matched 1.955 1.946 1.400 2.100 2.097  2.024 2.006 2.700 2.007 1.996 1.600 2.023 2.018 0.800 
No political links 
Unmatched 0.226 0.179 11.700 0.246 0.211 -1.600 0.176 0.172 1.000 0.385 0.336 10.200 0.447 0.426 4.300 
Matched 0.221 0.216 1.300 0.246 0.253  0.176 0.173 0.900 0.377 0.379 -0.400 0.448 0.451 -0.700 
Non-exporter 
Unmatched 0.676 0.770 -21.100 0.669 0.738 -1.900 0.700 0.774 -16.800 0.696 0.760 -14.400 0.686 0.762 -17.200 
Matched 0.684 0.695 -2.300 0.669 0.678  0.703 0.709 -1.400 0.713 0.712 0.400 0.714 0.712 0.500 
R&D 
Unmatched 0.091 0.089 0.700 0.135 0.078 1.700 0.113 0.099 4.500 0.104 0.099 2.000 0.117 0.109 2.300 
Matched 0.092 0.094 -0.900 0.135 0.130  0.112 0.114 -0.600 0.105 0.108 -1.200 0.118 0.116 0.400 
ln agglomeration Unmatched 1.852 1.710 13.500 1.863 1.795 0.800 1.791 1.642 13.400 1.818 1.718 8.800 1.806 1.791 1.300 
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Matched 1.842 1.836 0.600 1.863 1.854  1.789 1.772 1.600 1.814 1.803 0.900 1.816 1.800 1.400 
ln herfindahl 
Unmatched -6.102 -6.072 -2.800 -6.094 -6.107 1.200 -6.140 -6.090 -5.000 -6.129 -6.084 -4.900 -6.191 -6.141 -5.600 
Matched -6.104 -6.109 0.600 -6.094 -6.106  -6.145 -6.148 0.400 -6.144 -6.147 0.300 -6.213 -6.202 -1.300 
ln diversification 
Unmatched -0.412 -0.444 8.800 -0.377 -0.423 0.000 -0.654 -0.702 12.300 -0.637 -0.671 8.900 -0.632 -0.638 1.800 
Matched -0.414 -0.414 -0.100 -0.377 -0.377  -0.654 -0.656 0.500 -0.637 -0.641 1.000 -0.627 -0.630 1.000 
ln fixed costs 
Unmatched 1.128 1.177 -5.300 1.186 1.150 -1.400 1.152 1.153 -0.100 1.149 1.122 2.900 1.142 1.098 4.800 
Matched 1.133 1.141 -0.900 1.186 1.199  1.153 1.169 -1.800 1.147 1.161 -1.500 1.131 1.137 -0.700 
ln TFP 
Unmatched -2.114 -2.633 29.400 -2.084 -2.330 -1.100 -2.301 -2.698 22.600 -2.206 -2.594 22.400 -2.190 -2.466 16.300 
Matched -2.142 -2.166 1.400 -2.084 -2.065  -2.302 -2.309 0.400 -2.185 -2.217 1.900 -2.148 -2.193 2.600 
Rubin's B 
Unmatched 45.3*   34.8*   42.4*   42.0*   42.4*   
Matched 4.400   4.600   4.700   4.600   5.400   
Rubin's R 
Unmatched 1.070   1.130   1.110   1.070   1.330   
Matched 0.920   1.130   0.880   0.900   0.940   
 
  2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 
Variables  Treated Control %Bias Treated Control %Bias Treated Control %Bias Treated Control %Bias Treated Control %Bias 
Strong political 
links 
Unmatched 0.034 0.047 -6.300 0.030 0.042 -6.200 0.026 0.036 -5.800 0.023 0.030 -4.200 0.021 0.025 -3.000 
Matched 0.035 0.035 0.000 0.030 0.028 1.200 0.026 0.027 -0.300 0.024 0.023 0.000 0.021 0.022 -0.400 
State owned  
Unmatched 0.056 0.101 -16.800 0.040 0.075 -14.900 0.034 0.058 -11.500 0.028 0.046 -9.300 0.021 0.028 -4.800 
Matched 0.053 0.055 -0.700 0.037 0.037 0.000 0.032 0.033 -0.500 0.027 0.028 -0.800 0.021 0.021 -0.400 
Strong political 
links SOE 
Unmatched 0.014 0.023 -6.700 0.012 0.021 -6.800 0.009 0.016 -5.800 0.008 0.013 -4.700 0.006 0.008 -2.000 
Matched 0.013 0.013 0.200 0.012 0.011 0.600 0.009 0.008 0.600 0.008 0.008 0.200 0.006 0.006 -0.100 
Private owned  
Unmatched 0.632 0.707 -16.000 0.675 0.759 -18.700 0.710 0.791 -18.900 0.737 0.809 -17.200 0.760 0.839 -19.800 
Matched 0.673 0.670 0.500 0.757 0.755 0.400 0.763 0.760 0.700 0.798 0.797 0.300 0.808 0.809 -0.100 
Strong political 
links private-
owned 
Unmatched 0.014 0.017 -2.400 0.011 0.014 -2.300 0.013 0.016 -2.400 0.012 0.014 -1.800 0.011 0.013 -2.200 
Matched 0.015 0.014 0.300 0.012 0.011 0.900 0.013 0.014 -0.400 0.012 0.012 0.100 0.012 0.012 0.100 
Foreign owned  Unmatched 0.091 0.034 23.800 0.091 0.034 23.600 0.097 0.041 22.500 0.095 0.039 22.200 0.091 0.041 20.100 
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Matched 0.067 0.068 -0.600 0.047 0.049 -0.700 0.067 0.068 -0.500 0.052 0.053 -0.300 0.062 0.062 0.200 
HK/Macau/Taiwan 
owned  
Unmatched 0.108 0.046 23.400 0.110 0.046 23.700 0.100 0.045 21.400 0.091 0.049 16.400 0.088 0.042 18.600 
Matched 0.090 0.089 0.300 0.067 0.068 -0.700 0.075 0.075 0.000 0.069 0.069 -0.200 0.066 0.065 0.300 
Firm size 
Unmatched 4.803 4.684 11.200 4.644 4.476 16.000 4.707 4.552 15.100 4.662 4.525 13.400 4.639 4.481 15.600 
Matched 4.768 4.773 -0.500 4.550 4.571 -2.000 4.642 4.648 -0.500 4.592 4.603 -1.100 4.571 4.578 -0.700 
ln age 
Unmatched 1.995 2.080 -12.000 1.816 1.892 -9.700 1.905 1.993 -12.000 1.922 2.029 -14.900 1.953 2.050 -13.900 
Matched 1.999 1.990 1.300 1.816 1.812 0.600 1.912 1.909 0.300 1.946 1.940 0.900 1.974 1.970 0.600 
No political links 
Unmatched 0.509 0.494 3.200 0.781 0.742 9.200 0.748 0.727 4.600 0.775 0.762 3.200 0.785 0.787 -0.600 
Matched 0.510 0.507 0.600 0.777 0.777 -0.200 0.747 0.743 0.900 0.777 0.774 0.700 0.789 0.787 0.500 
Non-exporter 
Unmatched 0.693 0.771 -17.800 0.674 0.778 -23.400 0.685 0.776 -20.500 0.710 0.786 -17.400 0.743 0.812 -16.800 
Matched 0.712 0.725 -2.900 0.729 0.722 1.500 0.717 0.716 0.200 0.746 0.743 0.700 0.771 0.773 -0.600 
R&D 
Unmatched 0.115 0.111 1.500 0.114 0.092 7.400 0.089 0.075 5.200 0.094 0.074 7.300 0.101 0.079 7.800 
Matched 0.116 0.118 -0.700 0.107 0.109 -0.600 0.086 0.086 0.200 0.086 0.087 -0.500 0.094 0.094 -0.200 
ln agglomeration 
Unmatched 1.813 1.826 -1.200 1.895 1.932 -3.400 1.858 1.929 -6.400 1.837 1.967 -11.700 1.838 2.003 -15.200 
Matched 1.817 1.781 3.200 1.911 1.906 0.400 1.880 1.855 2.200 1.899 1.876 2.100 1.902 1.868 3.100 
ln herfindahl 
Unmatched -6.336 -6.312 -2.300 -6.527 -6.516 -1.000 -6.495 -6.495 0.000 -6.553 -6.551 -0.200 -6.676 -6.684 0.800 
Matched -6.350 -6.333 -1.600 -6.551 -6.552 0.200 -6.518 -6.516 -0.200 -6.577 -6.573 -0.400 -6.698 -6.703 0.500 
ln diversification 
Unmatched -0.699 -0.708 2.500 -0.631 -0.631 0.200 -0.654 -0.653 -0.200 -0.645 0.641 -1.000 -0.639 -0.627 -3.600 
Matched -0.699 -0.706 2.000 -0.631 -0.631 0.300 -0.652 -0.657 1.700 -0.639 -0.643 1.400 -0.632 -0.639 2.500 
ln fixed costs 
Unmatched 1.107 1.065 4.700 1.006 0.970 4.000 1.024 1.007 2.000 1.002 0.985 2.000 0.984 0.974 1.200 
Matched 1.103 1.120 -1.900 0.987 0.994 -0.700 1.015 1.023 -0.900 0.988 1.001 -1.500 0.976 0.986 -1.200 
ln TFP 
Unmatched -2.220 -2.521 18.500 -2.055 -2.309 16.700 -2.196 -2.407 14.200 -2.318 -2.319 13.300 -2.069 -2.207 10.200 
Matched -2.221 -2.238 1.000 -2.082 -2.109 1.700 -2.213 -2.252 2.700 -2.163 -2.191 1.900 -2.099 -2.134 2.600 
Rubin's B 
Unmatched 44.7*   46.0*   43.4*   42.5*   43.5*   
Matched 4.900   3.600   3.900   3.700   4.200   
Rubin's R 
Unmatched 1.440   1.450   1.490   1.360   1.400   
Matched 0.860   1.080   0.970   1.000   0.960   
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Table U.3 Balancing test results for firms with strong political links and firms with both type 
assistanceab 
 
  
Matched on Strong political links(1:1) Matched on both type assistance（1:5） 
Variable 
 
Treated  Control %bias Treated  Control %bias 
Receiving 
assistance 
Unmatched 0.529 0.621 -18.700 1.000 0.610 113.100 
Matched 0.529 0.518 2.200 1.000 0.559 127.700 
State owned  
Unmatched 0.434 0.059 96.600 0.389 0.067 83.300 
Matched 0.434 0.416 4.700 0.389 0.383 1.700 
Foreign owned  
Unmatched 0.077 0.073 1.800 0.099 0.072 9.700 
Matched 0.077 0.087 -3.800 0.099 0.112 -4.400 
HK/Macau/Taiwan 
owned  
Unmatched 0.030 0.083 -22.900 0.037 0.082 -18.900 
Matched 0.030 0.029 0.800 0.037 0.036 0.600 
Firm size 
Unmatched 5.056 4.685 29.000 5.270 4.687 46.400 
Matched 5.056 5.032 1.800 5.270 5.238 2.600 
ln age 
Unmatched 2.210 1.972 34.100 2.169 1.977 27.500 
Matched 2.210 2.217 -1.000 2.169 2.174 -0.700 
Private owned  
Unmatched 0.390 0.664 -57.000 0.415 0.659 -50.300 
Matched 0.390 0.399 -1.900 0.415 0.413 0.400 
Non-exporter 
Unmatched 0.789 0.730 14.000 0.729 0.732 -0.700 
Matched 0.789 0.788 0.200 0.729 0.730 -0.400 
R&D 
Unmatched 0.233 0.093 38.400 0.290 0.095 51.200 
Matched 0.233 0.238 -1.400 0.290 0.291 -0.100 
ln agglomeration 
Unmatched 1.097 1.885 -67.600 1.086 1.872 -65.300 
Matched 1.097 1.050 4.000 1.086 1.070 1.300 
ln herfindahl 
Unmatched -5.959 -6.476 45.000 -5.985 -6.466 41.500 
Matched -5.959 -5.916 -3.800 -5.985 -5.967 -1.600 
ln diversification 
Unmatched -0.650 -0.627 -5.600 -0.666 -0.627 -9.100 
Matched -0.650 -0.655 1.300 -0.666 -0.667 0.200 
ln fixed costs 
Unmatched 1.215 1.053 15.300 1.215 1.055 16.900 
Matched 1.215 1.234 -3.300 1.215 1.237 -2.400 
ln TFP 
Unmatched -2.874 -2.321 -33.300 -2.787 -2.332 -27.600 
Matched -2.874 -2.915 2.400 -2.787 -2.814 1.600 
Rubin's B 
Unmatched 139.0*   141.4*   
Matched 9.500   31.1*   
Rubin's R 
Unmatched 1.950   2.30*   
Matched 0.940   0.970   
aAccording to Rosenbaum and Rubin(1985), if the abs of reduced bias of covariates are lower than 20%, the "treated" and "control" groups are balanced. 
b Rubin (2001) recommends that B be less than 25 and that R be between 0.5 and 2 for the samples to be considered sufficiently balanced. 
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Table U.4:  Parameter estimates of estimated by Cox proportional Hazard Model on 
"matched" data  
 (1) (2) (3) 
VARIABLES matched on assistance (1:1) 
matched on strong 
political links (1:1) matched on both (1:5) 
Assistance rate<10.4% -0.168*** -0.091 -0.211*** 
Assistance rate10.4%–<15.2% -0.111*** -0.146** -0.031 
Assistance rate 15.2%–<18.7% -0.042** 0.051 -0.027 
Assistance rate 18.7%+ -0.163*** -0.134* -0.134** 
Assistance rate<10.4% × Period 2003-2007 0.044** -0.052 -0.003 
Assistance rate 10.4%–<15.2% × Period 2003-2007 0.111*** 0.104 0.032 
Assistance rate 15.2%–<18.7% × Period 2003-2007 0.175*** 0.211*** 0.187*** 
Assistance rate 18.7%+× Period 2003-2007 0.137*** 0.112 0.126** 
Strong political links -0.225*** -0.101 -0.223** 
Strong political links × Period 2003-2007 0.163 0.057 0.116 
Strong political links × Assistance rate<10.4% -0.250*** -0.278*** -0.149** 
Strong political links × Assistance rate 10.4%-<15.2% -0.050 -0.042 -0.046 
Strong political links × Assistance rate 15.2%-<18.7% -0.098* -0.276*** -0.123* 
Strong political links × Assistance rate 18.7% -0.142*** -0.158** -0.111* 
Period 2003-2007 0.412*** 0.135 0.185*** 
State owned -0.239*** -0.459*** -0.379*** 
State owned × Period 2003-2007 0.498*** 0.654*** 0.590*** 
Strong political links × State owned 0.209** 0.214** 0.237** 
Strong political links × State owned × Period 2003-2007 -0.208* -0.231* -0.203 
Private owned -0.093*** -0.310*** -0.166*** 
Private owned × Period 2003-2007 -0.120*** 0.064 -0.032 
Strong political links × Private owned 0.338*** 0.355*** 0.245** 
Strong political links × Private owned × Period 2003-2007 -0.125 -0.149 -0.118 
Foreign owned -0.442*** -0.770*** -0.725*** 
HK/Macau/Taiwan owned  -0.269*** -0.375*** -0.387*** 
Firm size -0.340*** -0.278*** -0.257*** 
ln age -3.743*** -3.936*** -4.004*** 
No political links -0.281*** -0.243*** -0.301*** 
Non-exporter 0.183*** 0.171*** 0.232*** 
R&D -0.600*** -0.792*** -0.713*** 
ln agglomeration -0.004 0.026*** 0.017* 
ln Herfindahl 0.054*** -0.018 0.045 
ln Diversification -0.286*** -0.178*** -0.277*** 
ln Fixed costs 0.006* 0.008 0.008 
City200 0.136*** 0.059** 0.134*** 
%open -0.081*** -0.081*** -0.080*** 
Tariff rate 0.020*** -0.017*** -0.010** 
East Coast -0.103*** -0.261*** -0.239*** 
North East -0.205*** -0.142*** -0.055 
Western -0.294*** -0.220*** -0.295*** 
ln TFP -0.206*** -0.118*** -0.057*** 
Industry dummies yes yes yes 
Log likelihood -1094567 -82809.475 -100244.75 
Observations 954,465 91,816 128,266 
Note *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Basic processing of data 
There are approximately 2.18 million observations in our dataset. We think it is important not 
to, a priori, drop what may seem to be outliers without direct evidence, except when the 
following conditions hold: 
a) We keep firms that establishing since the year 1978, because that's when China 
started the transition from a planned to market economy. 
b) When estimating TFP using system GMM (Harris and Li,2016)23, SIC12 (Timber 
logging industry) was dropped due to too few observations, SIC13 (Agricultura l 
and side industry), SIC5 (Beverages industry), SIC39 (Electrical machinery and 
equipment industry) and SIC40(Communications equipment industry) do not pass 
the Hansen test in the GMM estimation and are therefore omitted. Moreover, for 
SIC10,14,17,23,26,31,44,34,45 and 46 we use the BACON procedure in STATA 
to deal with outliers, with approximately 15% of observations being dropped from 
the empirical estimation of firm survival. 
c) For SIC34 and SIC43 there were no data on the open rate per industry/province, so 
these were omitted as well. 
Thus, after applying (a) – (c), we retain 1,322,907 observations for estimation. 
 
(2) Matching process  
In order to control the potential endogeneity of assistance, we separately matched on financ ia l 
assistance, strong political links and both; accordingly, there are 736,737, 49,862 and            
26,362 observations for each group (see Table U.5). We chose nearest neighbour matching 1:1 
with replacement for the first two groups and 1:5 with replacement24 for firms receiving both 
type of assistance. 
 
Table U.5  Process for Propensity Score Matching 
 Treated (On 
support) 
Untreated (On 
support) 
Matched obs. Remain for 
estimation 
Assistance 736,737 563,242 976,366 954,465 
Strong political links 49,862 1,302,944 92,872 91,816 
Both 26,362 1,326,444 129,828 128,266 
 
                                                 
23 TFP was taken from Harris and Li (2016), which uses the same methodology as that used in Ding et. al. (2016).  
24 We use replacement option because except for the year of 1998 and 1999, the number of "treated" group, which 
receiving financial assistance is much more than "control" group. Therefore, we use the replacement option for 
all matching to be consistent.  
